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ABSTRACT 
Behavioral Systems rely on valid measurement systems to manage processes and feedback 
and to deliver contingencies. An examination of measurement system components designed to 
track customer service quality of furniture delivery drivers revealed the measurement system 
failed to capture information it was designed to measure. A reason for this failure was an 
inadequate design, which resulted in sabotage of the measurement system by agents in the 
organization. The failure of this measurement system led to the ineffective operation of business 
processes and related systems. For example, a bonus pay system and a disincentive system 
were disabled due to the faulty measurement system. Suggestions for the development of a 
valid measurement system are offered.   
 
 
ARTICLE 
 
Behavioral Systems Analysis (BSA) involves analyzing components of interconnected 
processes that impact individual and organizational performance 
(Brethower, 1982, 2000, 2001, 2002; M. E. Malott, 2003; Sulzer-Azaroff, 
2000). According to Malott (2003), individuals behave in ways that should 
be consistent with the goals and mission of their organization. Individuals 
working together toward goals do so in organized processes that include 
the sequenced behaviors of individuals (or machines) across different functions 
and levels of the organization (Rummler, 2004). Brethower (2000) 
argues that these processes must be monitored via process and customer 
feedback to better align the processes with the system goals. 
 
Measurement is a key component of a healthy behavioral system. Techniques 
used in BSA require effective monitoring through measurement systems 
focusing on critical steps across organizational levels (Abernathy, 2000; 
Glenn, 1988; R. W. Malott, 1974, 1999; Rummler, 2004). When process data 
are collected and analyzed they can then provide feedback to individuals 
responsible for the process (Brethower, 2000). Process feedback can be 
used to shape behaviors necessary to accomplish the organization’s mission 
(M. E. Malott, 2003). If process feedback is not available, managers of the 
process have little basis for improving the processes and the behavioral 
contingencies therein. Processes become neglected (Katz & Kahn, 1966), 
and other organizational systems also fail to function. Thus, measurement 
systems provide the process feedback necessary for system survival. 
Measurement systems are used to assess employees, work groups, 
departments, or entire organizations with a variety of organizational measures 
(e.g., absenteeism, productivity, quality, etc.) that directly relate to 
critical business issues (Rummler, 2004). Measurement systems are designed 
not only to assess current levels of performance, but also to provide feedback 
to shape performance toward goals, aid in organizational diagnosis 
and improvement, and provide the foundation for bonuses and promotions 
(Anderson & Fagerhaug, 2002). “Measurement is the first step that leads to 
control and eventually improvement. If you can’t measure something, you 
can’t understand it. If you can’t understand it, you can’t control it. If you 
can’t control it, you can’t improve it” (Harrington & McNellis, 2006). 
 
 
Measurement Systems 
 
In the measurement literature, this feedback in behavioral systems has been 
referred to as “organizational control systems.” Organizational control is the 
“process of influencing members of a formal organization” (Flamholtz, 1979, 
p. 51). Organizational control systems are devised to increase the likelihood 
that members of an organization behave in ways that are consistent with 
organizational goals through the delivery of contingent performance feedback 
(see also M. E. Malott, 2003). Control systems allow leaders to regulate 
the activities of the organization and monitor achievement toward performance 
standards (Lewis, Goodman, & Fandt, 2004). Power (2004) explained 
that without effective measurement systems, organizations would be hindered 
by individuals who act in their own interests instead of those who help 
achieve organizational goals. 
 
Lewis and others (2004) outline the four major components of an effective 
organizational control system. The first component of a control system is the 
establishment of organizational goals. Hall (1975) explained that goals are 
important because resources can be distributed and policies can be created 
based on them. The next component is the establishment of standards of 
performance. In the next component, measurement is used to evaluate performance 
against these standards to discover gaps. Lastly, rewards can be 
assigned for surpassing the standard of performance, while corrective 
actions address deviations from the goal that are not acceptable. 
 
Measurement systems provide a framework from which decisions can 
be made and resources allocated (Anderson & Fagerhaug, 2002; Kula, 
1986). Data produced by measurement systems must allow the organization 
to predict future performance (Bassi & McMurrer, 2005) and serve as the 
foundation of many business decisions such as daily operations, planning, 
and early warning systems (Anderson & Fagerhaug, 2002). 
 
To eliminate situations where no contingencies exist and the behavior 
goes unchanged, measurement systems serve as the basis for incentive 
plans designed to reinforce behavior (Anderson & Fagerhaug, 2002). However, 
incentives can sometimes be fatal remedies when based on faulty 
measurement systems that create incentives for behaviors counter to the 
actual goals of the organization (Sieber, 1981). 
 
 
Components of a Good Measurement System 
 
To identify gaps in performance, Bassi and McMurrer (2005) state measurement 
systems should be “actionable,” focusing only on items that are under the 
control of the organization; “descriptive,” summarizing key system issues 
through statistics; and “detailed” to enable the organization to pinpoint 
behaviors in need of attention. A measurement system also needs to be 
accurate and consistent, producing unbiased, reliable data. Reliability is the 
degree of stability and consistency inherent in a set of data (Bernstein, Penner, 
Clarke-Stewart, & Roy, 2003). “Measurements are in principle replicable and 
not dependent on when, where, and by whom the measurement is done” 
(Power, 2004, p. 769). 
 
A measurement system should be parsimonious enough to facilitate 
reliable application and results. As a measurement system becomes more 
complicated, the reliability of the system tends to be challenged. An 
increase in variables to measure leads to an increase in measurement error 
(such as in code entry), which reduces reliability. In turn, user friendliness 
will increase the reliability of the measurement system. 
 
Bernstein and others (2003) explained that the usefulness of a measurement 
system is represented by the validity of the data produced. A number 
of factors can influence validity. The content validity of a measure is the 
degree to which the measure relates to the variable being assessed (Bernstein 
et al., 2003). Furthermore, a measure with high content validity samples all 
the variables related to the topic, not a small segment (Lanyon & Goodstein, 
1997). An invalid measure may not sample enough aspects of the variable 
or may assess components not related to the variable. 
 
A measurement system must facilitate timely delivery of feedback to 
employees to facilitate change and improvement in the organization 
(Anderson & Fagerhaug, 2002). The more proximal feedback delivery is to 
performance, the more effective the feedback is (Ludwig & Goomas, 2007). 
Feedback delivered proximal to performance allows the performer to gain 
access to information close to the emitting of behavior and more immediately 
correct errors. As time passes between behavior and feedback, the link 
between the behavior and its consequence is weakened, and feedback 
becomes less effective (Daniels & Daniels, 2004). 
 
Finally, Garnego, Biazzo, and Bitici (2005) state that measurement systems 
should include a review function that allows the system to be adapted 
to respond to changes and to fit with the strategy of an organization. A 
static measurement system in a dynamic organizational environment will 
quickly become obsolete. To ensure continued relevance, a measurement 
system must be dynamic and allow for change when needed. The system 
should be designed to allow employees and users to provide input to improve 
the utility of the measures and systems (Anderson & Fagerhaug, 2002). 
 
In summary, an effective measurement system must, first and foremost, 
be valid and reliable. In addition, the system needs to be dynamic enough 
to change with the organization. It must provide accurate and understandable 
feedback to employees and managers to monitor and help change 
behavior. Organizations that follow these guidelines measure meaningful 
variables accurately and are in a better position to manage control over 
organizational goals. 
 
 
Incentive Systems 
 
Incentive systems have been shown to decrease the amount of monitoring 
necessary for supervisors to maintain performance (Banker, Lee, Potter, & 
Srinivasan, 1996) if made contingent on performance (Bucklin & Dickinson, 
2001). Pritchard, Jones, Roth, Stuebing, & Ekeberg (1988, 1989) found that 
the addition of feedback to measurement systems increased the productivity 
of employees 50% over baseline levels. Furthermore, adding incentives 
increased productivity 76% over baseline performance. 
Incentives also serve as feedback for the performer (Goomas & Ludwig, 
2007). Indeed, the effects of feedback can be strengthened with the addition 
of rewards (Alvero, Bucklin, & Austin, 2001; Balcazar, Hopkins, & Suarez, 
1985/86; Welsch, Luthans, & Sommers, 1993). Thus, incentive systems have 
been found to be effective in organizations when contingent on desired 
behavior and paired with frequent feedback (Abernathy, Duffy, & 
O’Brien, 1982; Bateman & Ludwig, 2003; Dickinson & Gillette, 1993; 
Gaetani, Hoxeng, & Austin, 1985; Honeywell-Johnson, McGee, Culig, & 
Dickinson, 2002). However, if the measurements that serve as the basis of 
the incentive system are flawed, agents of the system may behave in ways 
to gain the incentive (or avoid the disincentive) that may not support the 
goals of the system. 
 
 
CASE STUDY 
 
The present report looked at the measurement system of a high-end furniture 
distribution company to identify weaknesses in design and implementation, 
and to interpret the causes of these weaknesses in context of a number of 
theories for management, economic, and psychological literature including 
organizational control, agency theory, and behavioral analysis. 
 
 
Company Profile 
 
This study was conducted at a furniture distribution company located in the 
southeastern United States that catered to high-end clientele throughout the 
country. This company received, stored, and distributed approximately 
60,000 furniture orders per year with an average of approximately $160 million 
in delivered sales yearly. 
 
Customer orders were received, and orders were placed with the manufacturer. 
Furniture pieces were then received from the manufacturer and 
stored in the warehouse. When all the pieces of a customer order were 
received by the warehouse, items were assembled, inspected, and repaired 
(if necessary). After the orders were prepared, furniture was loaded on a 
truck and delivered to a customer’s house, office, store, or other location. 
 
There were numerous errors that could occur during the delivery process, 
such as transit damages and leaving parts in the truck. When damaged 
or imperfect furniture was discovered after arriving at the customer location, 
drivers were required to call the company’s Customer Service Department 
for authorization to fix damaged pieces, schedule an outside repair, or 
return the furniture to the truck. Customer Service analyzed the estimated 
cost of the repair performed on site versus the cost of bringing the piece 
back to the warehouse for repair and redelivery before giving authorization. 
However, drivers employed by this company were leaving damaged, imperfect, 
and even incorrect furniture in the customers’ houses without calling 
Customer Service. 
 
 
Left in Home Unauthorized 
 
A Left in Home (LIH) error was defined as any piece of furniture in need of 
repair or return left in the delivery location without calling a customer service 
representative (CSR) for authorization. LIH errors also occurred when 
drivers waited to call CSR until after leaving the customer home or when the 
customers themselves called about a damaged or incorrect piece left in the 
home. Finally, the driver may report the LIH when the truck returned to 
the warehouse at the inbound docks. In each case, the damaged or incorrect 
piece was left in the delivery location and CSR was not called while 
the driver was at the customer location, therefore the driver did not 
receive authorization to leave the piece(s). LIH incidents resulted in the 
company having to contract a local professional to do the repairs at higher 
costs or send a truck out to pick up the furniture piece for repair and 
redelivery. 
 
The company had developed an elaborate listing of error codes for 
their measurement database to aid in the tracking and resolution of errors in 
delivery. The error code, description of the problem, furniture piece identification 
number, and actions taken were put into the database by either a 
customer service representative or the manager of the inbound delivery 
docks. The identifying number of the furniture piece could be tracked to 
the customer order and delivery team. 
 
 
Driver Pay System 
 
In addition to tracking errors, the measurement system was designed to 
input performance data into a pay system for delivery drivers. On a 
biweekly basis, drivers received a “load pay” amounting to 6.2% of the revenue 
of each order delivered to the customer. The driver team lost the load pay 
for a delivery if an error was recorded. An additional 25% of the load pay 
was eligible for a quarterly bonus. If errors were extensive, 10% of the 
bonus was forfeited. Moreover, an immediate charge of $200 was assigned 
automatically when LIH error codes were assigned. 
 
 
Major Agents of the Measurement System 
 
In addition to the CSRs and inbound managers who entered error codes, a 
number of other agents had an impact on the measurement system or were 
subject to contingencies based on the measurement system. 
 
 
DRIVER 
 
Delivery drivers delivered customer orders, unloaded and set up the furniture 
in the customer home or office, and inspected the furniture for defects. 
If any problems with the furniture piece were discovered during installation, 
drivers were trained to repair the piece. If the repair could not be done, the 
driver was to call Customer Service to determine whether to contract a local 
repair person or have the piece returned to the warehouse. After all orders 
were delivered, drivers returned to the warehouse, turned in paperwork, 
and unloaded any furniture items left on the truck. 
 
 
CUSTOMER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE 
 
If any problems arose during delivery, a CSR became the point of contact 
for resolving customer issues and recording errors in the Customer Service 
database. The CSR opened a problem slip in the database and recorded 
relevant customer and delivery information before describing the specific 
error in detail. The CSR then applied the most representative error code out 
of the possible 145 error codes in the Customer Service database. CSRs 
added information to problem slips to document steps made to fix the problem 
(e.g., repairs, subsequent delivery). 
 
 
INBOUND MANAGER 
 
When driver teams returned to the warehouse they were asked to recount 
any delivery errors that may have occurred. This information was recorded 
by the Inbound manager in the Inbound database with accompanying delivery 
and customer information. Error codes were applied from the list of 99 
Inbound problem codes. 
 
The Inbound database used a different coding system than the Customer 
Service database. The Customer Service database was the main measurement 
system designed to track errors and provide information for the company’s 
bonus pay systems. The Inbound measurement system, on the other hand, 
was designed to track problem furniture pieces as they moved through the 
resolution process. 
 
 
AUDITOR 
 
To check for accuracy, auditors monitored the application of codes in the 
Customer Service database. The audit procedure required that full records 
of errors affecting driver pay be reviewed. Written information in this database 
was compared to the CSR error code list to ensure the error code 
applied was accurate prior to bonus pay periods. 
 
 
QUALITY SERVICE MANAGER 
 
Quality service managers combined the Customer Service database and 
the Inbound database. The data from each database were extracted, 
combined, and aggregated to generate reports for various levels of management. 
These reports summarized the number of each error code 
monthly and were used to monitor error rates across variables of interest 
(e.g., driver, furniture brand, and store). Quality service managers 
also monitored both databases for irregularities and inconsistencies in 
reporting. 
 
 
VICE PRESIDENT OF OPERATIONS 
 
Among other responsibilities, the vice president of operations was in charge 
of monitoring and managing the performance of the drivers. Thus, the measurement 
and bonus pay systems were under his direct control. Reports 
generated by this measurement system were used to make his managerial 
decisions regarding personnel, customer service, and financial investments 
or cost cutting. It was the vice president who initially developed the disincentive 
system designed to reduce driver errors, including LIH. 
 
 
 
INVESTIGATION 
 
An investigation of the company’s measurement system data was undertaken 
to further pinpoint the variables of interest. This investigation specifically 
centered on the Customer Service database as the primary source used 
by the pay systems to evaluate driver performance and to dispense bonuses 
and penalties. This database housed the problem slips opened by the CSRs 
to document errors. 
 
Data were evaluated to examine error trends over a 7-year period, from 
2000–2006. During 2000 and 2001 the number of LIH errors went from 4,732 
to only 44. The number of authorizations (where drivers got permission to 
leave defective pieces in homes) went from 0 in 2000 to 3,235 in 2001. Very 
low levels of LIH were maintained through 2006 (see Figure 1). A preliminary 
 
 
 
hypothesis was that the substantial decrease in LIH errors was due to the 
implementation of the two disincentives (i.e., $200 charge in load pay and 
forfeiture of bonus pay) within the bonus pay system in October 2001. The 
initiation of the disincentive system was credited by the vice president to 
help alleviate an expensive problem for the company. It is also noteworthy 
that, from its inception in 2001, the measurement system seldom resulted in 
applying any disincentives to drivers for LIH errors. 
 
After further analysis it became apparent that the decrease in the number 
of LIH errors could not have been due to the disincentive. The disincentive 
was put in place in October of 2001; however, the decrease in the number 
of LIH errors seemed to begin in the first week of 2001. The question then 
became, “What happened at the beginning of 2001 that could account for 
such a drastic decrease of errors?” 
 
Interviews with management revealed that a new measurement system 
had been put in place at the beginning of 2001 to more accurately capture, 
report, and control errors. Year 2000 errors were not recorded by CSRs. 
Instead, reports were generated by reading the original customer service 
records, and errors for the year 2000 were recoded according to the new 
measurement coding system implemented in 2001. This post-hoc coding 
resulted in the wide discrepancy in the frequency of LIH errors between the 
years 2000 and 2001 (see Figure 1). 
 
Additionally, there was a consensus among employees consulting with 
the project that LIH errors were not being accurately captured. Interviews 
with various staff members revealed that employees had learned to manipulate 
the measurement system. Thus, a more thorough investigation was 
undertaken to reevaluate the data. 
 
For this investigation the quality service manager and another colleague 
analyzed Customer Service problem slips by hand for the month of 
August 2006, in the same way the year 2000 errors were coded previously. 
These paper records contained problem descriptions written by CSRs, 
including error codes assigned and details of the problems entered into a 
free response section. The details of the problem often revealed other errors 
that occurred during a delivery that were not assigned an error code. For 
example, an error code for “transit damage” may have been filed, but the 
written information stated that the furniture piece was left in the home without 
authorization. Thus, the error should also have been coded as LIH. 
 
An analysis of 160 problem slips from August 2006 determined that 63 
incidents (39.4% of the 160 incidents) should have been coded as LIH but 
were not. The Customer Service measurement system for this time period 
reported only 2 occurrences of LIH. Assuming that approximately 40% of 
the problem slips should have been recorded with an LIH code, as many as 
1,901 incidents of 4,824 problem slips opened in all of 2006 should have been 
recorded as LIH (see Figure 1). This estimated discrepancy suggested the system 
was not capturing LIH errors, and the measurement system had failed. 
 
 
 
FAILURE OF THE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
 
Too Many Error Codes 
 
Tangen (2004) explained that information overload can occur from too many 
performance measures, which results in inaccurate recording. As a result of the 
over 200 different codes, CSRs were applying only a handful of codes, mostly 
the general problem codes that they were most familiar with. CSRs reported in 
interviews that many of the codes were considered redundant, did not describe 
good performance, and were never used for reporting. The abundance of error 
codes greatly reduced the reliability of the data because different CSRs picked 
different error codes given the same information. No real operational definitions 
of these codes existed for the CSRs. Even employees who developed the system 
had differing opinions during interviews about what constituted various errors. 
 
To complicate matters, new codes could easily be created in the system 
with no prior approval. The system was designed to describe the error from 
the broadest category (i.e., what the error was) to the most precise (i.e., 
who did it, what furniture pieces were damaged, etc). However, the system 
had not maintained this order, nor was it ever clearly established according 
to this goal. Yet the system administrators and executives in the organization 
refused to simplify the system and reduce the number of codes used, 
even though it was common knowledge that fewer than 10 codes were 
being applied routinely. After all, “it is a waste of time to collect data if they 
are being ignored” (Tangen, 2004, p. 728). 
 
 
Inaccurate Feedback 
 
The company’s measurement system, designed to provide feedback for 
correcting gaps in performance, could not accurately or consistently identify 
performance errors. The reduced reliability and validity of the data resulted in 
inaccurate feedback. As a result, the employees monitored under this measurement 
system were incorrectly being told that they were behaving correctly. 
Similarly, reports using the system misled management by suggesting that customers 
were being left with high-quality furniture nearly 100% of the time. 
 
 
Misapplied Incentive Systems 
 
The failure of the measurement system led to a failure in the incentive system. 
Latham and Dossett (1978) explained that failure of incentive systems can be 
linked to money not being made contingent on verified performance. Additionally, 
the lag time between when data were entered and when drivers got 
feedback was often months. Drivers were supposed to be notified of errors via 
biweekly paychecks, when disincentives related to specific error codes were 
withheld from their pay. The majority of the time, however, drivers were made 
aware of errors only in an aggregated report in quarterly bonus. This lag time 
and the aggregation of target errors made it improbable if not impossible for 
drivers to link specific instances of errors to their feedback and incentive pay. 
 
 
Undermining the Measurement System 
 
Our investigation revealed that the measurement system seriously underreported 
thousands of LIH errors that may have been occurring each year. 
Thus, the incentive system may have ended up reinforcing behaviors that 
manipulated the system to avoid error code assignments. Indeed, drivers 
interviewed said they learned to call CSRs after multiple deliveries to avoid 
the LIH code or to wait to report errors to Inbound. However, weaknesses 
in accountability were not limited to drivers. There were also weaknesses in 
the recording, checking, and reporting of error codes. 
 
 
 
CORRUPTION OF THE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
 
Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) explores why the agents of the 
system begin acting in opposition to the system’s goals. In concert with 
behavior analysis (Skinner, 1953), we can examine specific contingencies 
that may have encouraged the manipulation of the measurement system for 
each major agent in the organization. 
 
 
Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory describes problems that arise in an organization by considering 
what occurs when different goals exist between cooperating parties 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory has been applied to economics (e.g., 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976), sociology (e.g., White, 1985), and organizational 
behavior (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1985) and has resulted in numerous literature 
reviews (Eisenhardt, 1989; Mitnick, 1992, 1998; Moe, 1984). 
 
Much of the research in this area revolves around the assumption that 
agents are “pursuing self-interest with guile” (Williamson, 1975, p. 134). 
Individuals act in a self-serving manner instead of acting in the best interest 
of the company, often to protect themselves from risk (Shapiro, 2005). All of 
the major agents in this case study had a number of reasons to sabotage the 
system in order to protect their own interests or the interests of others. 
 
According to Shapiro (2005), one of the problems that arise is what he 
calls “information asymmetries” and centers on the organization’s inability 
to know what its agents, or employees, are doing. This is often because the 
information cannot be obtained without great difficulty or expense (Eisenhardt, 
1989). The failure, in this case, of a measurement system to adequately 
inform the organization of its agents’ activities resulted in unreported errors 
in customer service. The agents of the measurement system in this case 
study began acting in opposition to the goals of the system. 
 
 
Behavior Analysis 
 
Behavior analysis examines the relationship between behavior and the environmental 
consequences of behaviors (Rogers & Skinner, 1956; Skinner, 1953). An 
important consideration is the response cost of the desired versus actual behaviors. 
Response cost is the effort required to do the behavior or to obtain a result 
based on the behavior(s) (Gormezano & Wasserman, 1992). The more effort 
required to achieve a result, the less likely the agent is to perform these behaviors. 
Response cost can punish responding when the consequence, or cost, of 
performing is increased effort on the part of the agent. In the present case, error 
reporting was laborious and, as a result, LIH data were not collected. 
In the context of the behavioral system, each agent had a variety of 
contingencies that could easily be used to explain their resistance to using 
the system as it was designed. Descriptions of the contingencies on each 
agent are detailed below. 
 
 
DRIVERS 
 
While delivery drivers were to call in and report LIHs, there was almost no 
reinforcement for doing so. Instead, if the drivers called in to report an 
error, they lost the pay they earned for that delivery. The load pay for the 
trip was paid to the driver teams only if the delivery was carried out without 
any error. Thus drivers began calling in to report the error after leaving the 
delivery location or reporting the error at Inbound to avoid the disincentive. 
In addition, drivers experienced response costs by making phone calls 
to Customer Service and going through the process of obtaining approval. 
By not calling from the customer’s home, drivers could avoid having to 
move the furniture piece back into the truck, reshuffling the rest of the day’s 
deliveries to make room, and unloading it at the warehouse. 
 
 
CUSTOMER SERVICE 
 
The correct application of the error codes by CSRs would have led to accurate 
records and reports, which may have resulted in praise from supervisors. However, 
these consequences were not salient to CSRs because reinforcement 
resulting from accuracy may never have occurred. In contrast, applying multiple 
error codes incurred response costs. So instead of opening separate problem 
slips for each separate error that occurred during a delivery, the CSR tended to 
report only one error and document the details of the delivery error in the trip 
detail section of the single problem slip. The LIH error did not get coded, and 
the text describing it became buried in the paperwork, which was not easily 
searchable and did not inform any of the measurement or pay systems. 
 
Further, incorrect error coding allowed CSRs to avoid uncomfortable 
social situations. The CSRs were being asked to help in administering the 
$200+ punishment to drivers. CSRs reported that the male drivers would 
boisterously cajole the female CSRs to change the code after the fact. Thus, 
recording errors resulted in arguments with drivers, which socially punished 
CSRs for applying the correct codes. Thus, CSRs learned over time that 
incorrectly coding these errors saved time, effort, and social unpleasantness. 
 
 
AUDITORS 
 
To verify the validity of the data produced by the measurement system, the 
organization appointed auditors to review Customer Service records for 
inaccurate error codes before issuing quarterly bonuses. This entailed the 
review of thousands of records for the quarter, which auditors reported as 
“tedious and boring.” In order to avoid the response costs auditors would 
procrastinate. According to interviews, auditors tended to wait until the last 
minute to perform the audits because these duties interfered with regular 
tasks required in their job. In practice, auditors put off the task for so long 
others had to review the records for them. Sometimes extensions were 
applied for and/or the review was never completed. Thus, there were not 
sufficient reinforcers to offset the response costs of correctly doing the 
audits, and this eliminated the only source of data verification. 
 
 
QUALITY SERVICE MANAGER 
 
Quality service managers were supposed to monitor the database on a daily 
basis to ensure accuracy and resolve problems. Additionally, the separate Customer 
Service and Inbound databases were supposed to be merged by quality 
service managers. Instead of continued monitoring and improvement, quality 
service managers complicated the measurement system by adding unnecessary 
codes and restrictions. If the different Inbound and CSR databases were combined 
and the coding system simplified, the result may have been a decreased 
need for the quality service manager position to exist. However, the continued 
growth of the measurement system made the position important, thereby reinforcing 
behaviors that may have led to increased complexity and confusion. 
 
 
VICE PRESIDENT 
 
Ultimately, the vice president for operations used the reports generated by 
the measurement system to make business decisions. However, the flawed 
system led the VP to conclude LIH errors due were not a problem. Because 
he designed the measurement and incentive systems, the VP received praise 
for seemingly addressing the costly problem of LIHs. With errors averaging 
approximately $5 per incident, the resolution of one of the most prevalent 
errors was a major accomplishment. This resulted in positive consequences 
such as increased responsibility, career growth, and recognition. Repairing the 
measurement system after it was obvious that it was flawed would have drawn 
scrutiny of the unchecked costly errors and social disapproval from superiors. 
 
 
Suggestions for a New Measurement System 
 
The measurement system was designed to capture errors in the delivery 
process as they occurred and summarize trends to aid in the resolution of 
these problems. The other goal of the measurement system was to provide 
the quantitative basis for the company’s incentive system. However, the lack 
of reinforcement for oversight resulted in invalid data remaining hidden for 
over 5 years and contributed to bad organizational decisions. Additionally, 
the contingencies surrounding the measurement system reinforced agents 
for manipulating the processes for their own benefit and/or the benefits of 
others. The likelihood that an agent will act in the interest of the organization 
increases when the organization has information that can be used to 
verify the behavior of the agents (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, the measurement 
system should be repaired by refocusing on its designed purpose. 
 
 
SYSTEM RESTRUCTURING 
 
A measurement system needs to capture enough detail to inform business 
decisions and provide information about employee performance. A redesign 
must pinpoint areas where the organization can make improvements. If 
these specific variables are captured by the system, management of performance 
improvement becomes more effective. Eisenhardt (1989) explained 
that when managers and employees are rewarded for outcomes dependent 
on the same behavior, the conflicts between the two parties are reduced 
and employees are more likely to act in the interest of the organization. A 
new single measurement system should be developed based on the mission 
and goals of the organization first, then the goals of the departments, and 
individuals should be considered next. The resulting goals (e.g., customer 
service) should then be used to develop the variables to be assessed. 
 
Ultimately, the variables measured must be under the control of the 
organization and its agents (Bassi & McMurrer, 2005). The agents who use 
the system daily (e.g., CSRs and Inbound managers) are experts who should 
be consulted concerning what aspects of the system work, which codes are 
actually used, and which could be discarded. Consequently, using the 
agents in system redesign will increase buy-in, which may ensure the system 
will be supported and used properly. Furthermore, this redesign using the 
agents who will end up using the system will allow more reliability and 
validity in the application of codes. 
 
Lastly, the system should be flexible and allow for change when 
needed. It is essential that the organization routinely review the accuracy of 
the system and the variables captured by auditing the system. The system 
must be monitored to ensure that it examines the most important variables 
and can accommodate any new variables needed. However, these changes 
should not be at the discretion of any one user. Thus, access to system 
design features should be limited. By creating an avenue for evaluation and 
improvement, the continued relevance of the measurement system can be 
maintained in the face of changes (Garnego et al., 2005). 
 
 
PROCESS-BASED CHANGE 
 
In the failed measurement system, driver errors could be recorded in 2 systems 
with almost 250 choices of codes to apply between them. The codes were 
housed in separate systems and applied by separate agents and had no tangible 
link to one another. Codes were often redundant within a single system and 
even more so between the systems. Codes were then merged to form a single 
report used to make business decisions. This report was mainly informed by 
the Customer Service database and was supplemented by Inbound data when 
errors were not captured wholly by the Customer Service data. 
In a new system, all agents would enter error codes into the same system. 
The agents would choose from a number of error code options limited to 
only the most relevant. Multiple codes should be captured in one problem 
slip. Additional important information (i.e., agent responsible for error, 
furniture brand or type) could be made selectable in a searchable format. 
This would allow for the information needed to be more easily identified 
through searches without complicating the error coding process. 
 
 
TRAINING 
 
Individuals who use the system and apply the codes need to be aware of 
how it is to be used and what it was supposed to accomplish. Technical 
training will provide information required to use the system (Lewis et al., 
2004), such as standardized definitions and examples of each code. Training 
will increase fluency in application and increase reliability and validity. 
 
 
AUDITING/ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Coding inaccuracies were overlooked in the audit process of the current measurement 
system. According to Power (2004), auditing is the organizational 
equivalent of scientific replication in that it serves as “institutional revisiting 
of performance measures” (p. 770). The auditing system needs to be 
reworked to reduce the aversive costs associated with the process. The 
existence of two databases measuring the same errors resulted in unnecessary 
redundancies and response cost in the auditing process. Any measurement 
system should compile one database and build information 
technology to automate the audit process. The management team should 
reinforce frequent auditing, perhaps making it a weekly instead of a quarterly 
process. The reduced lag time will reduce the number of records to be 
audited at a given time. Moreover, the company could designate auditing as 
the primary responsibility of a clerical employee. 
 
 
FEEDBACK 
 
With enhanced auditing, frequent feedback could be provided. Also, a 
report on the accuracy of code entry would allow the company to reinforce 
CSRs’ coding. A new measurement system should enhance the timeliness 
and clarity of feedback to drivers as well. Frequently verified error codes 
could be translated into driver feedback more often than once a quarter. 
Delivery performance can be made available electronically through cellular 
phones or computers in the delivery trucks. In addition, weekly reports 
should be issued, highlighting areas of success and areas in need of 
improvement. The feedback loop, then, provides an avenue for evaluation 
and improvement of the system and performance. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Purchase decisions are made on expectations rather than complete information, 
thus the higher a customer’s expectation of product quality, the higher the 
price the customer is willing to pay (Goering, 1985). Indeed, an organization’s 
competitive advantage depends on the quality of its goods and services 
(Gronroos, 1988). When making purchasing decisions, the two most important 
factors according to customers are product quality and the company’s handling 
of service failures (Conlon & Murray, 1996). When customers are not 
satisfied with the service received, they may relay this information to 10–20 
people (Mattila, 2001). 
 
For the business reviewed in this case, a defective furniture piece left in 
a customer’s home could influence future purchasing decisions by these 
high-end customers. Thus, special measurement systems were designed to 
influence deliverer behavior. However, very real and significant side effects 
of the faulty measurement system had gone unnoticed. 
 
The most obvious side effect of measurement system failure was the 
incentive system failure. The manipulation of the system made these incentives 
ineffective. Drivers were being reinforced; however, it was not contingent 
on any accurate measure of performance. As Latham and Dossett (1978) 
explained, reinforcement (i.e., monetary incentives) needs to be contingent 
on performance to be effective. Instead, the incentive was resulting in 
increased expenses for the company without the benefit of managing key 
quality behaviors visible to the customer. The only real consequence of this 
system was the illusion of improvement. 
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